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ABSTRACT
This report presents the results of an investigation to
develop a methodology for evaluating crew communication behavior
on the flight deck and a flight simulator experiment to test the
effects of crew member expressivity, as measured by the Personal
Attributes Questionnaire, and flight task on crew communication
and flight performance. A methodology for coding and assessing
flight crew communication behavior as well as a model for
predicting that behavior is advanced. Although not enough crews
were found to provide valid statistical tests, the results of the
study tend to indicate that crews in which the captain has high
expressivity perform better than those whose captain is low in
expressivity. There appears to be a strong interaction between
captains and first officers along the "level of command" dimension
of communication. The PAQ appears to identify those pilots who
offer disagreements and initiate new subjects for discussion.
BACKGROUND
The need for effective cockpit management is not new to
aviation. Crew coordination and effective leadership have long
been stressed in multi-person flight crews. However, the need for
a training program designed specifically for teaching cockpit
management is just now being recognized. At least twelve airlines
are conducting some form of management training for pilots. At a
recent NASA/Air Force workshop on cockpit management training,
many other airlines were in attendance seeking ideas and
assistance for the development of such training. Despite this
attention, many pilots are reluctant to fully endorse this type of
training.
Historically, there are at least three reasons for pilot
reluctance to accept management training. Pilots have resisted
any suggestion that they consider a threat to their authority on
the flight deck. They have also tended to resist ideas that are
not clearly measureable by physical evidence. There may also be a
tendency among pilots to hold the technical skill of maneuvering
the aircraft above their management duties. Thus, while business
executives can easily accept such training, pilots are reluctant
to accept management training. In this sense, aviation is far
behind the business fields.
However, recent airline accidents identifying faulty cockpit
management as the cause have focused attention on this problem.
During the past fifteen years, there have been at least sixteen
airline accidents in which poor cockpit management or
communication identified as a contributing factor. These data
represent over 60 percent of the airline accidents during this
period. Table 1 presents these sixteen accidents.
Table 1. Air Carrier Cockpit Management Related Accidents
United Airlines, 727, Chicago, Dec 8, 1972
Eastern Airlines, L-1011, Miami, Dec 29, 1972
Pan American, Pago Pago, Jan 30, 1974
Eastern Airlines, DC-9, Charlotte, Sept 11, 1974
TWA, 727, Berryville VA, Dec 1, 1974
PanAm and KLM, both 747s, Tenerife, Mar 27, 1977
United Airlines, DC-8, Salt Lake, Dec 18, 1977
National Airlines, Pensacola, May 8, 1978
United Airlines, DC-8, Portland, Dec 28, 1978
Western Airlines, DC-10, Mexico City, Oct 31, 1979
Danair, 727, Tenerife, April 1980
Air Florida, 737, Washington, Jan 13, 1982
Air Illinois, Beech 99, Oct 11, 1983
Avianca Airlines, 747, Madrid 1985
Delta Airlines, L-1011, Dallas, 1985
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In recognition of the need for cockpit management training,
NASA began a research program in the mid 1970s on this topic.
Another important concern at the time was the effect of fatigue on
cockpit management. A NASA sponsored flight simulator experiment
by Patrick Ruffell-Smith (1979) is generally recognized as the
premier study of this topic. In 1979, NASA sponsored a workshop
for airline, government, and university people to discuss the
problem of cockpit management and focus research efforts in this
direction. In 1981, The Ohio State University initiated the
biennial symposium on aviation psychology which includes a
significant section on cockpit management.
In the airline industry, cockpit management training programs
began in 1979 with KLM which developed a comprehensive five-day
training program. USAir and United Airlines began training in
1982. The United program has received a great deal of publicity
because of the committment of the airline to provide the training
to all of its pilots in a short time. They were also motivated by
a wavier of some recurrency training requirements, and they
received strong ALPA encouragement. At this writing there are
some twelve airlines and/or training organizations offering some
form of cockpit management training. Most other airlines are
considering this training.
What is CRM Training?
It has become a cliche1 in the aviation community to say that
the role of the pilot has been changed by technology. Formerly,
the primary task of the flight crew was manual control of the
aircraft and navigation. In modern aircraft much of the actual
control manipulation and navigation can be "down-loaded" to the
autopilot and flight management computer. The task of managing
the flight deck, that has always been a part of the crew's
responsibility, is now becoming their primary task. . This
management task is being called, cockpit resource management
(CRM).
One of the keys to good CRM, as in any management position,
is communication between crew members. Information must be
requested, offered, and/or given freely in a timely way to permit
the captain to make accurate effective decisions. It also
requires an understanding of communication styles used by other
members of the crew for interpretation and determination of the
proper emphasis for a response. Finally, it requires an
understanding and acceptance of the role and responsibility of
each member of the crew to work as a team.
CRM training can and does take many different forms.
However, one important aspect to all training of this type is
effective communication. Therefore, all CRM training programs use
some method to teach effective communication in the cockpit. Most
programs also teach pilots various aspects of management,
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leadership, interpersonal relationships, the effects of stressors
including fatigue, and team or group dynamics.
The Evaluation Development Task
The objective of the present study, which began in 1982, was
to determine the effect of pilot fatigue on cockpit communication
and resource management. However, because this was the first
empirical study designed to systematically examine cockpit
communication, the major effort of the program was focused on the
development of tools to examine cockpit communication behavior.
CRM evaluation and cockpit communication evaluation, in
particular, are challenging tasks. Both are complex human
behaviors involving mental activity that cannot be observed
directly. People often have well developed mechanisms for
disguising the true meaning behind what they are actually saying.
To an extent, the objective of CRM training is to break down these
mechanisms and teach pilots to communicate on the surface level at
all times. However, the evaluation task requires an understanding
of communication even at this level.
Although communication behavior can be observed, it is very
complex. Various coding techniques have been devised but all must
be administered manually. As such they are subject to human
interpretation and error. For these reasons pilots are very
reluctant to permit the evaluation of their management behavior.
The following is a list of additional reasons for the resistance
offered by pilots to such evaluations:
1. Pilots generally have strong egos which may be
threatened by an examination of their management style.
2. Evaluation of CRM is an additional hurdle for pilots to
cross to prove that they are proficient. This will
likely be seen as an unwarranted additional Federal
regulation.
3. Pilots may fear that because this is not an exact
science, there will be an opportunity for a vindictive
examiner to offer negatively biased results.
4. CRM evaluation could be considered to be another threat
to the job and economic security of pilots.
5. Some pilots fear that the records of the evaluation
could be used against them later in their careers.
For these reasons, pilot groups have asked that all
evaluation of CRM, including that done for experimental reasons,
be done either through the pilot's "self-examination" or through
totally de-identified responses from the pilots. United Airlines
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goes so far as to erase the video tape of the pilot's LOFT
performance in front of the pilot following the debriefing. They
will not save the tape even if the pilot wants it. Such
limitations make it difficult to determine whether or not CRM
training makes any difference.
Literature Review
Why do some cockpits run smoothly with few incidents of
endangered safety and others reflect a lack of communication and
even open conflict? Shroyer of United Airlines points out that to
work in harmony, we must know what we ourselves, are doing and
what others are doing in our communications and our management
style, Helmreich views instrumentality and expressivity as
significant predictors of the process variable of crew
coordination. In his 1983 research, he found evidence that
personality traits are directly linked to overall flightdeck
performance (Helmreich, 1983). Further research will add data on
the effects of leader and member personality profiles in the
flight crew interactional process. Helmreich later pointed out
(1983) that the best captain, one who creates an environment of
teamwork, will have high goal and high group orientation. Blake
and Mouton (1978) stressed that the most effective management
style is associated with a profile encompassing both
characteristics.
A review of communication literature and recent CRM research
was conducted in search of communication evaluation methodologies.
The assessment methodologies used in these basic communications
studies may be useful in the development of evaluation procedures
for two-person communication behavior that occurs in the cockpit.
This literature review has uncovered numerous communcation studies
from the social psychology literature (e.g., Rogers and Farace,
1975),
In the development of the Personal Attributes Questionnaire
(PAQ) measuring instrumentality and expressivity, S'pence and
Helmreich (1978) found that, while some personality profiles
exhibit predominantly instrumentality (goal orientation) and
others predominately expressivity (group orientation), it is
possible for an individual to be high in both. Millar and Rogers
(1976) focused their research on the relational nature of
communication, developing a coding schema to index relational
content, defining message sequences and map transactional
patterns. They developed a three digit coding of relational
structure which was then amplified to include the control
direction of messages.
The classic CRM study, sponsored by NASA (Ruffell-Smith,
1979), provided graphic evidence that the majority of crew
performance problems were related to breakdowns in coordination of
crew members. It further pointed out that crews having the
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highest errors had the most difficulties in crew communication and
crew interaction. Task performance was interrupted by demands
from other crew members. Foushee and Manos, in their group
process study (1981), analyzed voice recordings from the
Ruffell-Smith Study - finding some significant communication
patterns. They concluded, in part, that there was a tendency for
crews which communicated less to perform less well. An even more
important role in the group process was played by the type and
quality of communication.
METHOD
The objective of this study was to examine the performance and
communication of highly trained professional pilots as they flew a
LOFT scenario that included equipment failures from one airport to
another. Although the flight was made in a simulator, every effort
was made to create an impression of line-oriented flight realism
for the subject-pilots. This level of realism was necessary to
bring about accurate verbal and skill responses from .the subjects.
Despite of the realism of the task, a high level of experimental
control was maintained throughout the experiment.
Experimental Facilities
The experimental facilities consisted of a T-40 twin-jet
simulator, an experimenter/ATC station, a PDF 11/34 minicomputer,
and a video recorder. The T-40 simulates a T-39 aircraft in the
Air Force, which is a small twin jet used to transport generals
and other high-ranking officers. Its counterpart, in civilian
aviation is the Sabreliner, a common corporate jet. The T-40
cockpit seats a pilot and copilot and has a third seat behind the
flight crew for a non-flying crew member or instructor. It has
all of the necessary instruments and controls for a realistic
instrument flight. It is mounted on a motion platform with two
degrees of freedom - pitch and roll.
The experimenter/ATC station is connected to the T-40,
providing duplicates of many of the cockpit instruments and a
plotter showing the current status • of the flight. At this
station, the desired navigation world can be programmed. A
communications system permits the controller to direct the flight
from that point. Numerous system failures can be introduced from
this station, which also has initial condition and slewing
capabilities.
The PDF 11/34 minicomputer was interfaced with the T-40 to
automatically record 13 performance parameters. These include,
altitude, heading, course deviation, vertical speed, throttle,
gear, flap, speedbrake, and time.
A video camera was mounted on the door of the simulator which
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provided a panoramic view of the cockpit and the back of the
pilot's heads. Most non-verbal movements could be picked up from
this view. Separate microphones were installed to pick up the
conversations between the pilots and ATC for the video recorder.
Experimental Sub.lects
The subjects used in this experiment were corporate pilots
and a few airline pilots from Ohio and surrounding states who
volunteered to serve. No payment was offered or made for the
service. All subjects were experienced jet or turbo prop pilots
with at least 50 hours in a turbine aircraft of some type.
Efforts were made to accomodate the schedules of the pilots,
including flying at all hours and with the crew of their choice.
In every case, both members of the crew were subjects in the
study. Table 1 presents the experience levels of the experimental
subjects used in this study.
Table 1. Experience Levels of Experimental Subjects
Sub $ Position Age Cert Total Hrs Simul Recent Turbine
015
019
023
025
026
027
028
029
030
032
033
038
039
041
044
045
048
049
050
051
054
055
056
057
064
065
F/0
F/0
Capt
Capt
F/0
Capt
F/0
Capt
Capt
F/0
Capt
F/0
Capt
F/0
F/0
Capt
Capt
F/0
Capt
F/0
F/0
Capt
Capt
F/0
F/0
Capt
24
30
42
36
42
54
45
43
36
33
37
47
41
36
42
41
39
25
42
30
34
44
46
33
31
32
Com
ATP
ATP
ATP
Com
ATP
Com
ATP
ATP
Com
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP
1,350
4,500
13,500
5,400
3,500
10,100
4,300
6,500
7,500
3,150
2,000
10,700
7,200
7,800
7,000
7,000
6,000
3,350
12,000
3, 100
5,500
5,000
16,400
4,400
3,950
4,300
0
0
70
30
30
150
12
20
30
37
85
80
5
350
50
150
300
4
250
100
0
100
110
12
25
30
300
163
250
150
200
25
80
150
150
210
200
100
35
200
200
200
250
300
200
200
100
150
455
150
250
250
150
1,050
5,000
1,000
200
7,000
250
2,000
3,300
1,010
2,000
700
1,000
4, 500
2,800
6,000
300
1,200
2,500
300
400
1,500
14,300
52
2,000
1,700
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Experimental Procedures
Familiarization. Subjects were permitted to appear for their
initial familiarization flight either alone or with a qualified
fellow crew member. Subjects were ' given a series of
questionnaires to fill out prior to beginning their
familiarization flight. These questionnaires (shown in Appendix
A) include a biographical questionnaire focusing on flight
experience, a consent form, and a Personal Attributes
Questionnaire (PAQ).
Following the completion of these questionnaires, subject-
pilots were seated in the T-40 simulator for the cockpit
familiarization. They were given a T-40 Familiarization sheet
(shown in Appendix A) and a audio tape recorder with a cockpit
familiarization tape. They were told to listen to the tape and
perform all cockpit functions suggested on the tape. The tape led
them through all aspects of the cockpit and operation of the
simulator. This part of the familiarization took about 20 minutes
to complete.
Following the completion of the cockpit familiarization, the
experimenter discussed with the subject pilots any questions that
they may have had in the operation of the simulator. Then the
experimenter took his/her place at the ATC station and directed a
familiarization flight around a closed-loop course in the
Minneapolis area. This flight included a takeoff from Minneapolis
on Runway 29L, a climb out on VI3 to Gopher VOR, a turn onto V2 to
Press Intersection, a direct to Farmington VOR, and an ILS Runway
4 approach into Minneapolis airport. If there were two pilots in
the familiarization, both received a turn at the controls for the
flight while the other served as copilot. If only one pilot was
present, the experimenter served as the copilot in the
familiarization.
Personal Attributes Questionnaire. One of the objectives of
this study was to determine the effect of individual communication
style, in general, on cockpit communication and performance. At
NASA's suggestion, the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ), an
instrument developed by Spence and Helmreich (1978), was chosen as
the instrument to identify pilots who were high or low on
"Expressivity" and high or low on "Instrumentality". It was
expected that most pilots would score high on instrumentality
because they tend to be "goal" oriented individuals. It was not
known where they would score on the expressivity scale.
The PAQ, shown in Appendix A, is a 62-item questionnaire
consisting of two parts. Although our subjects completed all 62
items, they were scored only on Part I, the first 40 questions.
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The following formuli were used to compute the instrumentality (I)
and expressivity (E) score:
I = 3 + 9 + 16 + 26 + 28 + 31 + 33 + 40
E = 5 + 11 + 13 + 15 + 20 + 25 + 35 + 36
Where: The numbers represent question numbers in the
instrument.
The numbers used for computation are the subject's
responses to the questions.
Responses identified as "A" through "E" are scored "0"
through "4", respectively.
Question 26 is scored in the reverse direction.
The following criteria were used to identify pilots on the
two scales:
High I/High E - I 2 21, E 2 23
High I/Low E - I 2 21, E < 23
Low I/High E - I < 21, E >. 23
Low I/Low E - I < 21, E < 23
Where: I = Instrumentality or goal orientation
E = Expressivity or group orientation
As indicated below, the experiment was designed to
systematically match pilot and copilot by their PAQ score so that
each combination of high and low expressivity was equally
represented in each position. However, because our pilots were
volunteering their time, we sometimes had to compromise the
experimental design to obtain a particular crew to serve as
subjects. Our particular group of pilots happened to have more
low expressivity people than high. Consequently, we ended up with
more pilots in this group.
Experimental flight. Following the familiarization, an
experimental flight was made consisting of a "Line Oriented
Flight" from Milwaukee to Minneapolis. Subject pilots were given
a previously prepared flight plan for the flight as well as
present and forecast weather information, and aircraft weight and
fuel status prior to takeoff (Appendix B). They were permitted to
prepare for the flight together but they were encouraged to do
much of that preparation in the cockpit. When the pilots entered
the cockpit, the video recorder was turned on, recording all
conversation and activity. During the takeoff roll, the computer
-8-
was "turned on to record the performance of the crew throughout the
flight.
During the experimental flight, the experimenter served as
the air traffic controller. No other assistance was given to the
crew. Two failures were introduced, an engine failure during the
enroute phase of the flight at FL280 and a glideslope failure
which did not become evident until the interception of the ILS.
Realistic weather conditions were introduced to direct the flight
to the destination and prevent wide deviations from the intended
course .
Experimental Design
The experimental design for this study is a mixed design with
two between subject factors, each having two levels, and one
within subject factor with several components. The two
between-subject factors, shown in Figure 1, were expressivity and
crew position (captain vs first officer). Our plan was to run six
crews of each type, provided they could be found. The within
subject factor was task and included a number of sub-tasks as
candidates for analysis including, departure, enroute before and
after engine failure, letdown, and approach. The dependent
measures were communication (type and frequency) and flight
control performance (measured automatically on the computer) .
CAPTAIN
Hi I/Hi E i 6 crews I 6 crews
i i
F/0 i 1
! 1
Hi I/Low E ! 6 crews ! 6 crews
1i _________
Figure 1. Experimental design
We had planned to do a replication of the above design with
crews in a "fatigue" condition (after 11:00 PM) . However, because
we were unable to find any crews who were willing to make the
volunteer flights in this "fatigue" condition, this part of the
design had to be dropped. We would suggest that future
experiments requiring corporate flight crews in such a condition
must provide funding for meals, accomodations , and service
compensation for the subjects.
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Data Analysis: Communication Coding
One of the most challenging and important aspects of this
experiment was the analysis of the communication data recorded on
video tape. To determine the effect of 'the variables of concern,
it was necessary to establish a reliable methodology for
quantifying communication data. This development effort began
with a review of the communication coding literature. The most
promising source was an article by Rogers and Farace (1975) in
which the authors present a communication coding scheme designed
to show the impact of "control" being exercized in dyadic
communications. Their objective was to show when each member was
demonstrating "one-up-manship" or "one-down-manship".
Our coding scheme for cockpit communication, shown in Table
2, is designed to identify a similar control factor. It employs
some of the particular forces that are present in cockpit
communication. The first four terms in the control code,
"command," "request," "suggestion," and "observation," are
designed to indicate the level of cockpit communication control
being sought on a continuum similar to that suggested by
Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958). Other terms, such as
"disagreement," "question," and "initiate new subject" would show
different levels of control being sought in a more general way.
Finally, our scheme includes two terms that are fairly specific to
the aviation communication environment, "acknowledgment" (usually
"Roger") and "checklist call out" which is a part of standard
operating procedures. It should also be pointed out that the
terms used in the cockpit context are restricted in meaning
because of the technology involved. Usage of some of these terms
would be quite different in a classic analysis of dyadic
communication.
Table 3 presents a concept model of the types of
communications expected to result. It indicates what might be
expected in terms of control being sought with each type of
communication. For example, one would expect that pilots who are
high in expressivity would demonstrate a greater rate of
communication of the one-up-manship type, and pilots who are low
in expressivity would 'express themselves more frequently with
one-down-manship types of communication.
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Table 2. Four-Element Coding Scheme Used to Analyze Cockpit
Communications.
Coding Scheme
1. Speaker
1. Captain
2. First Officer
2. Form
1. Statement
2. Question
3. Exclamation
4. Non-Verbal
3. Direction
1. Other Crew
2. ATC
3. Self or Aircraft
4. Control
1. Command
2. Request
3. Suggestion
4. Observation
5. Acknowledgment
6. Checklist Item
7. Answer
8. Disagreement
9. Initiate-Terminate
0. None of Above
Definitions of Control Terms:
Command; An authoritative order
directing action of the object.
Example: "Gear up."
Request: A communication asking for
something to be given or done, said
with less authority than a command.
Example: "Would you please call for
weather?"
Suggestion: To mention or introduce
an idea for consideration or action.
Example: "Why don't we check the
weather at our destination."
Observation: To offer in communi-
cation what one has seen, noticed,
or perceived. Example: "We have
just passed the station.
Acknowledgment: To indicate receiv-
ing and understanding a fact.
Example: "Roger, 40RJ."
Checklist Item: Communication read
from checklist. Example: "Flight
instruments - Check."
Answer: To respond to a question,
suggestion, checklist item, or com-
munication that is not simply an
Acknowledgment, or Agreement.
Example: "Flight instruments,
checked.
Disagreement: To differ in opinion.
Example: "No, I don't think we
should try that approach."
Initiate-Terminate: To begin or end
a line of thought. Example: "Where
did you learn to fly anyway?"
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Table 3. Predicted Cockpit Communication Control as a Function of
Form and Control Type.
4 One-up-manship
if One-down-manship
fr Across - neither up nor down
— Unlikely communication or not clearly interpretable
FORM
Statement Question Exclamation Non-Verbal
1. Command / 4 4 4 4
2. Request 4 * 4 4
3. Suggestion &• &• 4
4. Observation &• t ' ^ ?-
5. Acknowledgment * — — *
6. Checklist 5- - 4
7. Answer t . -f 4 t
8. Disagreement 4 4 4 4
9. Initiate-Terminate 4 4 4
0. Other - - -
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RESULTS
The results of this investigation cover four major types of
data: PAQ results, performance results, communication results and
debriefing results. Because the number of crews found in two of
the expressivity conditions was so small (two), standard
statistical tests were not possible. Therefore, instead of
providing these test results, the data are presented showing
trends which are useful in determining the need for further
research.
PAQ Results
A total of 61 pilots took the PAQ and received the
familiarization flight. Of these, 3 were low on Instrumentality,
58 were high. On the Expressivity scale, 24 of these pilots were
high and 37 were low. Of the 61 pilots, 26 made up 13 crews that
successfully completed their experimental flights. Table 4
presents the PAQ scores for the 26 pilots who made successful
experimental flights.
Table 4. PAQ Scores (I/E) of Experimental Pilots.
Expermental Condition
Capt Hi E, F/0 Hi E
Average
Capt Hi E, F/0 Low E
Average
Capt Low E, F/0 Hi E
Average
Capt Low E, F/0 Low E
Captain (Sub #)
I/E
22/23 (039)
27/24 (050)
30/27 (056)
26/25
23/27 (027)
23/23 (065)
23/25
26/17 (030)
23/19 (033)
25/18
F/0 (Sub #)
I/E
22/28 (038)
22/25 (049)
26/24 (057)
23/26
21/22 (028)
24/17 (064)
23/20
19/24 (019)
22/23 (032)
21/24
Average
26/22
23/21
21/21
27/11
24/22
28/22
25/20
(023)
(025)
(029)
(048)
(055)
(045)
24/21
18/19
29/17
23/22
21/22
24/21
23/20
(015)
(026)
(041)
(051)
(054)
(044)
One can see from Table 4 above that, among the 13 crews who
flew the experimental flights, we did not get an even mixture of
each combination of high and low expressivity. In fact, there
were three crews in which both captain and first officer were high
in expressivity. There were two crews with a high expressivity
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captain and low expressivity first officer, two crews with a low
expressivity captain and high expressivity first officer, and six
crews in which both captain and first officer were low in
expressivity.
Performance Results
It should be pointed out first that all crews performed the
LOFT exercise very well, including coping with the engine failure,
flying to the destination, and making the single-engine,
localizer-only approach. All made the flight as requested in a
professional manner that appeared to represent the way they would
have flown in the airplane. Only one crew refused to participate
in the experiment when it came time to sign the consent form.
This crew was from the FAA and felt that signing the form was in
violation- of their employment regulations. Many comments
concerning the quality of the simulation and experimental
procedures can be found in the answers to' the debriefing found in
Appendix D.
Although 13 different performance items were recorded during
the experimental flight, for a number of technical reasons, the
only consistantly reliable result was altitude deviation from
28,000 feet during the enroute portion of the flight. The results
of this analysis, shown in Table 5, indicate that pilots, overall,
did better at altitude control before the engine failure than
following the engine failure. They also show that captains who
scored high on expressivity maintained their altitude much better
than those who scored low on this measure. This observation is
true both before as well as after the engine failure. Captains
usually had manual control of the airplane during this portion of
the flight.
Table 5. RMS Altitude Error in Feet for Four Combinations of
Crews Before and after Engine Failure (EF).
Expressivity Before EF ' After EF, Average
(Capt,F/0)
H,H (n=2 crews) 69 145 107
H,L (n=2 crews) 215 246 230
Average (Hi E Capt) 142 195 168
L,H (n=3 crews) 690 636 663
L,L (n=5 crews) 321 476 398
Average (Lo E Capt) 459 536 497
Overall Average 353 422 387
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Communication
Overall results. The main PAQ validation question should be
answered in the form of overall communication for those high and
low in expressivity. Our communication analysis concentrated on
the 20-minute time period from 10 minutes before the engine
failure to 10 minutes after the failure. As shown in Table 6, the
overall communication rate varied from a low of 2.88
communications per minute before the engine failure for captains
with low expressivity, to a high of 5.93 after the engine failure
for first officers with low expressivity.
These results tend to show that the PAQ does not predict
overall cockpit communication rates very well. High E captains
have a higher communication rate than Low E captains, but the
reverse is the case for first officers. The results do show that
co-pilots make more communications than do the captains, in part,
because they are the primary communicator with the ATC. As one
would expect, there are higher communication rates after than
before the engine failure.
Table 6. Overall Communication Results (In Communications/Min)
Captain
Hi E Lo E
n = 5 n = 8 n
Before EF 3.32
After EE 4.83
Average 4.07
2.88
3.58
3.23
Hi E
= 5
2.97
5.23
4.10
F/0
Lo E
n = 8
3.72
5.93
4.82
Table 7 presents detailed overall data showing the
communication rate for each captain and first officer for the time
period before and after the engine failure that was coded. From
these data, one can see the effect of the various combinations of
crews have high and low expressivity. Crews made up of one high E
member and one low E member tended to have higher rates of
communication than crews in which both members were the same.
A weakness in the PAQ as a predictor of overall communication
rate is pointed out in the result of one particular crew. The
crew made up of 48L,51L had the highest rate of communication of
all crews. Yet their PAQ E scores were low. In fact, the first
officer's E score was 11, the lowest of all subjects tested.
However, this particular subject was one of the most talkative
persons this researcher has ever met. The PAQ is obviously
testing for another dimension in the case of this individual.
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Table 7. Communications by Subject Before and After Engine Failure
(H = High Expressivity, L = Low Expressivity)
Before EF
Crew # of Com Time Com Rate
Capt,F/0 Capt,F/0 Coded Capt,F/0
After EF
# of Com Time Com Rate
Capt,F/0 Coded Capt,F/0
39H.38H 16,24
50H,49H 27,32
56H.57H 22.25
Totals 65,81
Average for H,H
27H.28L 52,36
65H,64L 50.67
Totals 102,103
Average for H,L
30L.19H 16,23
33L.32H 29.42
Totals 45,65
Average for L,H
9.65
10.00
10.68
30.33
1.66,2.49
2.70,3.20
2.06.2.34
2.14,2.67
10.00
10.00
20.00
9.00
9.80
5 . 2 0 , 3 . 6 0
5 . 0 0 . 6 . 7 0
5.10,5.10
1.78,2 .56
2 . 9 6 . 4 . 2 9
23L.15L
25L.26L
29L.41L
48L,51L
55L,54L
45L.44L
Totals
29,36
28,13
11,19
38,64
31,40
29.24
166,196
18.80
10.00
10.12
10.60
11.70
8.53
9.38
60.33
Average for L,L
2.39,3.46
2.90,3.60
2.77,1.28
1.04,1.79
3.25,5.47
3.63,4.69
3.09.2.56
2.75,3.25
21,25
29,41
46.41
96,107
55,74
68.108
123,182
35,42
49.89
84,131
36,43
37,28
13,40
13,38
31,52
39.36
169,237
10.00
10.00
20.00
2.39,2.85
4.39,6.21
4.61.4.10
3.78,4.22
5.50,7.40
6.80.10.8
6.15,9.10
10
10
20
10
9
7
3
9
10
50
.00
.13
. 13
.00
.75
.17
.20
.88
.62
.62
3.
4.
4.
3.
3.
1.
4.
3.
3.
50,
84,
17,
60,
79,
81,
06,
14,
67,
4
8
6
4
2
5
1
5
3
.20
,79
.51
.30
.87
.58
1.8
.26
.39
3.34,4.68
Form. As defined by the coding model, "form" refers to the
gramatical form used, including statement, question, and
exclamation, plus non-verbal forms of communication. Tables 8 and
9 show the communication rate vs the form as defined by the coding
model, before and after the engine failure respectively. These
data indicate that most of the communications take the form of
statements, with questions coming in second. Very few
exclamations and non-verbals are offered. An almost equal rate of
questions is offered by high E and low E crew members.
It is interesting to note that, although our model predicted
that high E crew members would show higher exclamation rates, the
reverse is true. In fact, high E captains did not offer a single
exclamation before and only two after the engine failure. Low E
captains, on the other hand, offered them at the rate of .16
coms/min with high E first officers and .12 coms/min with low E
first officers before the engine failure. After the engine
failure, the exclamation rate was reduced. High and low E First
officers offered about the same number of exclamations regardless
of the expressivity of the captain.
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Table 8. Communication Rate as a Function of Form Before EF
Crew
Cpt , F/0
39H.38H
50H,49H
56H.57H
Totals
Ave rate
27H,28L
65H,64L
Totals
Ave rate
30L.19H
33L,32H
Totals
Ave rate
23L.15L
25L,26L
29L.41L
48L,51L
55L.54L
45L,44L
Totals
Ave rate
Time Statement Question Exclamation Non-Verbal
Coded
9
10
10
30
—
10
10
20
—
9
9
18
—
10
10
10
11
8
9
60
-
.65
.00
.68
.33
H,H
.00
.00
.00
H,L
.00
.80
.80
L,H
.00
.12
.60
.70
.53
.38
.33
L,L
14,
21,
18,
53,
1.75,
39,
39.
78,
3.90,
10,
24,
34,
1.81,
26,
17,
6,
32,
23,
21,
125,
2.07,
21
28
22
71
2.34
34
56
90
4.50
22
35
57
3.03
31
12
2
50
34
19
163
2.70
2,
6,
la.
11,
0.37
1,
8j.
9,
0.95
4,
2_L
6,
0.31
2,
6,
2,
5,
7,
li.
29,
0.48
1
2
3
6
,0.20
1
6
7
,0.35
10
5
15
,0.32
4
1
1
12
5
4
27
,0.45
0
0
0
0
0.00,
0
0
0
0.00
2
1
3
0.16
0
3
1
1
1
9
>
i-
I
0
t
_L.
)
9
9
t
9
)
9
9
9
t
1
1
0
2
.06
0
3
3
0.15
0
1
1
0.05
1
0
0
1
0
1.1
7
0.12
9
9
3
0.05
0,0
0,1
i^ Q
1,1
0.04,0.
2,1
3.2
5,3
0.25,0
0,0
2.1
2,1
0.10,0
1,0
2,0
0,1
0,1
0,1
0.0
3,3
0.05,0
07
.15
.05
.05
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Table 9. Communication Rate as a Function of Form After EF
Crew
Cpt , F/0
39H,38H
50H.49H
56H.57H
Totals
Ave rate
27H,28L
65H,64L
Totals
Ave rate
30L.19H
33L,32H
Totals
Ave rate
23L.15L
25L,26L
29L,41L
48L,51L
55L,54L
45L,44L
Totals
Ave rate
Time Statement Question Exclamation Non-Ve.rba
Coded
8
6
10
30
—
10
10
20
—
10
10
20
—
10
9
7
3
9
10
50
-
.77
.60
.00
.33
H,H
.00
.00
.00
H,L
.00
.13
.13
L,H
.00
.75
.17
.20
.88
.62
.62
L,L
20,
22,
45,
87,
2.87,
52,
54,
106,
5.30,
25,
48,
73,
3.63,
26,
30,
11,
9,
23,
28,
127,
2.51,
24
39
40
103
3.40
64
99
163
8.15
36
78
114
5.66
41
25
33
32
47
29
207
4.09
1,
7,
1.
9,
0.30,
2,
10.
12,
0.60,
9,
1L.
9,
0.45,
9,
4,
o,
3,
8,
10.
34,
0.67,
1
1
1
3
0.10
6
6
12
0.60
6
10
16
0.79
2
2
7
6
5
7
29
0.57
o,
o,
o.,
o,
0.00,
o,1*1,
0.05,
1,
o_,1,
0.05,
1,
o,
o,
o,
o,
fi*
1,
0.02,
0
1
0
1
0.01
0
2
2
0.10
2
o
2
0.10
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0.02
0
0
0
0
0.00
1
3
4
0.20
0
1
1
0.05
0
3
0
1
0
1
5
0.10
,0
,0
, Q
,0
,0
,4
.a
,5
,0
,0
. 1
,1
,o
,0
,0
,0
,0
, 0
. Q
,o
.0
.00
.25
.05
.00
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Direction. Tables 10 and 11 show the communication rate
versus the direction before and after the engine failure,
respectively. It can be seen that most of the communication is
directed at the other crew member. The first officer is the
primary communicator with the ATC. However, it is interesting to
note that our low E Captains communicated with ATC at a very high
rate after the engine failure perhaps not trusting the first
officer. First officers tend to talk to themselves more than do
the captains.
Table 10. Communication Rate as a Function of Direction Before EF
Crew
Cpt
39H
50H
56H
>
>
>
>
F/0
38H
49H
57H
Totals
Ave
27H
65H
i
>
rate
28L
64L
Totals
Ave
SOL
33L
i
>
rate
19H
32H
Totals
Ave
23L
25L
29L
48L
55L
45L
>
>
i
9
)
1
rate
15L
26L
41L
51L
54L
44L
Totals
Ave rate
Time Other Crew ATC Self or Aircra
Coded
9
10
10
30
—
10
10
20
—
9
9
20
—
10
10
10
11
8
9
60
-
,65
.00
.68
.33
H,H
.00
.00
.00
H,L
.00
.80
.13
L,H
.00
.12
.60
.70
.53
.38 '
.33
L,L
16,
26,
21.
63,
2.08,
45,
48,
93,
4.65,
14,
24,
38,
1.89,
25,
20,
9,
33,
26,
25,
138,
2.72,
16
25
19
60
1.98
30
60
90
4.50
18
31
49
2.43
31
10
11
41
29
19 ,
141
2.79
o,
1,
1L.1,
0.03,
o,
o ,
o,
0.00,
o,
1 .
1,
0.05,
o,
2,
o,
1,
o,
0-L.
3,
0.06
6
5
6
17
0.56
3
3
6
0.30
5
5
10
0.50
2
0
5
13
9
4
33
,0.65
o,
o,
1^
1,
0.03,0.
7,
2^
9,
0.45,
1,
2^
3,
0.15,
o,
5,
o,
1,
3,
ii
10,
0.20,
1
1
0
2
07
3
4
7
0.
0
A
4
0.
1
3
3
6
2
1
16
0.
35
20
32
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Table 11. Communication Rate as a Function of Direction After EF
Crew
Cpt,
39H,
50H,
56H,
F/0
38H
49H
57H
Totals
Ave
27H,
65H,
rate
28L
64L
Totals
Ave
30L,
33L,
rate
19H
32H
Totals
Ave
23L,
25L,
29L,
48L,
55L,
45L,
rate
15L
26L
41L
51L
54L
44L
Totals
Ave rate
Time Other Crew ATC Self or Airc
Coded
8
6
10
30
-
10
10
20
—
10
10
20
-
10
9
7
3
9
10
50
-
.77
.60
.00
.33
H,H
.00
.00
.00
H,L
.00
.13
.13
L,H
.00
.75
.17
.20
.88
.62
.62
L,L
21,
26,
46,
93,
3.07,
51,
68,
119,
5.95,
33,
40,
73,
3.63,
34,
31,
11,
10,
31,
39.
156,
3.08,
22
34
29
85
2.80
47
86
133
6.65
34
57
91
4.52
34
14
27
24
35
20
154
3.04
o,
2,
,3
,6
0.11
2,
0.07,
1,
<L
1,
0.05,
1,
6,
7,
0.35,
o,
2,
o,
3,
o,
<L
5,
0.10,
,20
,0.66
,19
,10
,29
,1.45
,6
i_£
,15
,0.75
,9
,5
,10
,3
,14
,11
,52
,1.03
0
0
,0
,1
0.0
0
0.00
3
0
3
0.15
0
2
2
0.10
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
0.04
,1
,0.
,8
.12
,20
,1.
,2
.23
,25
,1.
,0
,9
,3
,10
,3
. 5
,30
,0.
03
00
24
59
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Control. Figures 1 through 9 present data concerning the
four levels communication control from the coding model. Figure 1
shows the overall communication rate for the four control terms
that were predicted to indicate decreasing levels of control. As
one might expect, a strong interaction is evident along this
dimension between the captain and the first officer. Captains
make more commands than requests and suggestions. First officers
make fewer commands but more requests and suggestions. Both
pilots make a lot of observations but the co-pilots make many
more. The interaction is evident both before and after the engine
failure, although captains make many more commands after the
engine failure than before, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Figures 4 -through 9 focus on data observed after the engine
failure, when the crew is coping with the problem and developing
an alternative plan. Figures 4 and 5 examine the two levels of
expressivity in captains and first officers, respectively. Figure
4 shows that High E captains make many more suggestions and
observations than low E captains, while Figure 5 shows that low E
first officers make more requests than do high E first officers.
The other control factors result in nearly equal rates of
communication for the two levels of expressivity. An interesting
observation in these data is that Low E captains and first
-officers tend to give more requests than suggestions. High E
captains and first officers behave in the opposite way. Perhaps,
the request represents a lower level of command to low E pilots
but a higher level of command to high E pilots.
Figures 6 through 9 focus on the communication behavior of
the four types of crews as they are matched on the expressivity
scale. In all cases the interaction between the captain and first
officer remains intact. However, captains, in the presence of a
first officer with the same expressivity level, tend to give a
greater number of commands. In expressivity "mixed" crews, first
officers make many more observations.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
OVERALL DATA
I i.o
u °-8
CL
LU 0.6
CC
O
O
0.4
0.2
0
F/0
CAPT
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 1. Communication Rate versus Control Level for captains
and first officers.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
BEFORE EF
i.o
u3 o.s
CL
Id 0.6
0.4
O 0.2
CJ
0
p F/0
CAPT
I
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 2. Communication Rate versus Control Level for captains
and first officers before the engine failure.
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o:
UJ
Q_
UJ
01
O
o
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
AFTER EF
pF/o
7
/
/
/
/
1
 ^ CAPT
1
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 3, Communication Rate versus Control Level for captains
and first officers after the engine failure.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
CAPT, AFTER EF
1.4 r-
1.2
1.0
ce
£0.8
^0.6
0.4
8°-?
0
CAPT HI E
CAPT LO E
i
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 4. Communication Rate versus Control Level after the
engine failure"for high and low E captains.
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1.4
1.2
COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
F/0, AFTER EF
• F/O LO E
/P F/O HI E
UJ _ ^
GL 0.8
cj
0.6
0.4
0 2
•
0 1
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 5. Communication Rate versus Control Level after the
engine failure for high and low E first officers.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
CART HI E, F/0 HI E
AFTER EF
1.4
2 1.2
5
CC '
CL 0.8
H 0.6
0:1
 0.4
§ 0.2
F/0 HI E
CAPT HI E
-O— D
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 6. Communication Rate versus Control Level after the
engine failure for a "mixed" crew consisting of a high
E captain and a high E first officer.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
CART HI E7 F/0 LO E
AFTER EF
F/O LO E
CAPT HI E
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 7. Communication Rate versus Control Level after the
engine failure for a crew consisting of a high E
captain and low E first officer.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
CAPT LO E, F/0 HI E
AFTER EF
1.6 r
, 1.4
1.2
g 1.0
Q_
LU 0-8
< 0.6
0.4
0.2O
D F/0 HI E
CAPT LO E
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 8. Communication Rate versus Control Level after the
engine failure for a crew consisting of a low E captain
and a high E first officer.
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COM RATE vs CONTROL LEVEL
CAPT-LO E, F/0 LO E
AFTER EF
1.4 r-
1.2
1.0CC
UJ
0. 0.8
LU
°-
6
^ „0.4
80.2
F/0 LO E
CAPT LO E
CMD REQ SUG OBS
CONTROL LEVEL
Figure 9. Communication Rate versus Control Level after the
engine failure for a crew consisting of a low E captain
and a low E first officer.
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Other Control factors. Tables 12 and 13 present control, data
on the other factors of the coding model, including
acknowledgments, checklist items, answers, disagreements, and
initiate-terminate before and after the engine failure,
respectively. High E captains had a higher rate of
acknowledgments than low E captains both before and after the
engine failure. First officers did not show this difference.
Checklist items are almost exclusively offered by first officers
except for one of our low E captains (the same one who talked
frequently to ATC).
Disagreements and initiate-terminate appear to be reliable
control factors predicted by the PAQ. High E captains and first
officer raise more of both of these type of communications than do
low E crew members. This observation is true both before and
after the engine failure.
Table 12. Control Communications Before Engine Failure
Crew
Cpt F/0
Time Acknowl
Coded C FO
Checklt
C FO
Answer
C FO
Bisagre
C FO
Ini-Ter
C FO
39/H 38/H
50/H 49/H
56/H 57/H
Total 30.33 6,12 0,0 8,13 2,4
Ave rate - H,H 0.20,0.40 0.00,0.00 0.26,0.43 0.07,0.13 0.13,0.36
9.
10.
10.
65
00
68
1
3
2
,3
,5
,4
0
0
0
,0
,0
,0
0
3
5
, 2
,1
, 4
0,
2,
o!
2
2
0
o,
o
•^ j
o
3
O
-J
5
4,11
27/H 28/L 10.00
65/H 64/L 10.00
Total 20.00
Ave rate - H,L
8,3
8.3
0,4
0,10
2,15
15, 13
0,0
1.0
1,1
0. 1
16,6 0,14 17,28 1,0 1,2
0.80,0.30 0.00,0.70 0.85,1.40 0.05,0.00 0.05,0.10
9.00
9.80
1,2
2.2
0,4
3,6
0,1
3.2
1,0
0. 1
0,1
1. 10
30/L 19/H
33/L 32/H
Total 18.80 3,4 8,10 3,3 1,1 1,11
Ave rate - L,H 0.16,0.21 0.43,0.53 0.16,0.16 0.05,0.05 0.05,0.59
23/L
25/L
29/L
48/L
55/L
45/L
Total
15/L
26/L
41/L
51/L
54/L
44/L
10.
10.
10.
11.
8.
9.
60.
00
12
60
70
53
38
33
0,
1,
0,
3,
2,
2,
8,
7
0
0
7
2
2
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
,0
,0
,1
,0
,5
,0
,6
1,
1,
3,
7,
8,
3,
23,
4
5
5
11
14
5
44
0,0
2,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
2,0
0,0
6,0
1,4
o n:i, , *.'
4, 6
7.3
20,18
Ave rate - L,L 0.13,0.30 0.00,0.10 0.38,0.73 0.03,0.00 0.33,0.30
ORIGINAL PACE ?S
OF POOR QUALITY
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Table 13. Control Communications After Engine Failure
Crew
Cpt F/0
39/H 38/H
50/H 49/H
56/H 57/H
Total
Ave rate -
27/H 28/L
65/H 64/L
Total
Ave rate -
30 /L 19/H
33/L 32/H
Total
Ave rate -
23/L 15/L
25/L 26/L
29/L 41/L
48/L 51/L
55/L 54/L
45/L 44/L
Total
Time
Coded
8.77
6.60
10.00
25.37
H,H
10.00
10.00
20.00
H,L
10.00
10.13
20. 13
L,H
10 . 00
9.75
7. 17
3.20
9.88
10.62
50.62
Acknowl
C
3,
6,
7,
16,
0.63,
8,
9,
17,
0.85,
1,
10,
11,
0.55,
5,
4,
3,
o,
1,
3.
16,
FO
5
3
15
23
0.91
10
7
17
0.85
2
10
12
0.60
7
5
4
1
1
7
25
Checklt
C
0
0
0
0
0.00
0
0
0
0.00
0
0
0
0.00
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
FO
,2
,13
,2
,17
,0.67
,13
. 14
,27
,1.35
,7
.16
,23
,1.14
,6
,5
,12
,12
,7
,7
,49
Answer
C
2,
2,
0,
4,
0. 16,
10,
5,
15,
0.75,
1,
15,
16,
0.79,
4,
4,
5,
3,
5,
5,
26,
FO
1
11
0
12
0.47
9
o
11
0.55
2
7
9
0.45
8
1
0
2
17
9
30
Disagre
C
o
^ >1,
0,
3,
0.12,
o,
1,
1,
0.05,
o,
1,
1,
0.05,
•1
- J
o,
0,
0,
o,
0.
1,
FO
1
1
0
2
0.08
0
0
0
0.00
0
3
3
0.15
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
Ini-Ter
C
0,1
4,3
0,3
4,7
0.16,0
o rs<j i *j
0 , 1
3,4
0. 15,0
0,0
3,6
3,6
0.15,0
2,0
3 , 3
. 0,3
2,3
0,4
2, 1
9 iw* , _
FO
.28
.20
. 30
4
Ave rate - L,L 0.32,0.49 0.00,0.97 0.51,0.59 0.02,0.04 0.13,0.28
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Debriefing Results
Table 14 presents the results of a debriefing questionnaire
in which pilots were asked for opinions concerning their attitudes
about cockpit communication. This questionnaire consists of the
11 most significant questions from a 25-item instrument used
extensively by Dr. Robert Helmreich in his research on airline
crews. In this questionnaire, pilots were to respond by circling
the response of their choice from the following:
1) Disagree Strongly, 2) Disagree Slightly, 3) Neutral, 4) Agree
Slightly, or 5) Agree Strongly
The 11 questions were as follows:
1. The pilot flying the aircraft should verbalise his plans for
maneuvers and should be sure that the information is
understood and acknowledged by the other pilot.
2. It is important to avoid negative comments about the
procedures and techniques of the other crew members.
3. Overall, successful flightdeck management is primarily a
function of the flying proficiency of the captain.
4. The captain should take control and fly the aircraft in an
emergency and non-standard situations.
5. First officers should not question the decisions or actions
of the captain except when they threaten the safety of the
flight.
6. Captains should encourage their first officers to question
procedures during normal flight operations and in
emergencies.
7. There are no circumstances (except total incapacitation)
where the first officer should assume command of the
aircraft.
8. Casual conversation in the cockpit during periods of low
workload can improve crew performance.
9. My decision making ability is as good in emergencies as in
routine flying situations.
10. An effective pilot can leave behind personal problems when
flying.
11. Pilots should feel obligated to mention their own
psychological stress or physical problems to other flightcrew
personnel before or during a flight.
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Table 14. Results of Helmreich Attitude Questionnaire
Crew
Cpt,F/0
39/H,
50/H,
56/H,
27/H,
65/H,
38/H
49/H
57/H
28/L
64/L
1
4,5
5,5
5,5
5,5
5,5
2
5,4
2,5
5,1
5,1
1,4
3
2,2
2,1
2,2
4,5
5,2
4
3,4
3,1
2,2
1,1
3,4
Question
5 6
1,5
1,2
1,2
1,1
5,1
2,
5,
5,
5,
1,
5
4
4
5
5
1,
1,
2,
1,
1,
7
1
4
3
1
9
5,
5,
4,
4,
5,
8
4
5
4
4
5
9
2,5
5,5
4,4
4,1
5,4
o
<L
2
4
1
3
10
,4
,4
,5
( 4
',4
11
4,4
4,5
5,5
5,5
4,4
30/L,19/H
33/L,32/H 5,5 3,1 4,1 5,1 4,1 3,5 3,1 5,4 3,4 4,2 3,4
23/L, 15/L
25/L,26/L
29/L.41/L
48/L.51/L
55/L,54/L
45/L,44/L
5,5
4,4
1,5
5,5
5,5
1,
3,
7
5,
4,
2
2
5
3
4
3,
4,
1,
2,
1,
4
4
2
1
1
5,
4,
1,
4,
3,
4
9
3
1
3
4,
2,
4,
1,
4,
4
1
2
1
4
5,
4,
5,
5,
4,
5
5
5
5
4
1,
4,
•1,
2,
4,
3
1
4
1
5
3,5
4,4
4,5
4,3
4,4
3,
4,
1,
3,
2,
4
5
4
4
4
'
1,
4,
3,
5,
4,
5
4
o
5
4
5,5
3, 3
1,3
5,4
1,4
Table 15 is a summary of Attitude Survey. It can be seen
from this table that the strongest overall negative response was
to Question 7, which refers to the circumstances where the first
officer should assume responsibility. All pilots, but captains in
particular, believe that there are circumstances (other than total
incapacitation) where the first officer should assume command.
The most agreement was found with the first question which states
that the pilot flying should verbalise his plans and be sure they
are understood. These results are similar to those found by
Helmreich for airline crews (Helmreich, 1983; Helmreich, Foushee,
Benson, and Russini, 1985).
Question Captain
H L
First Officer
H L
Ave
1_
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
4.
3.
3.
2.
1.
3.
1.
4 .
4.
2.
4 .
80(0
60(1
00(1
40(0
80(1
60(1
2 0 ( 0
60(0
00(1
40(1
4 0 ( 0
. 4 0 )
. 7 4 )
. 2 6 )
.80)
. 60 )
. 7 4 )
. 4 0 )
.49 )
.09)
.02)
.49 )
4
3
2
3
3
4
2
4
2
3
3
.17(1
.20 (1
.50(1
.67(1
.17(1
. 3 3 ( 0
.50(1
. 0 0 ( 0
. 6 7 ( 0
.50(1
.00(1
. 4 6 )
. 33 )
. 2 6 )
.37)
.21)
.75 )
. 2 6 )
.58)
. 9 4 )
. 2 6 )
.63 )
5
2
1
2
o£.
4
2
4
4
3
4
. 0 0 ( 0 .
. 7 5 ( 1 .
. 5 0 ( 0 .
.00(1 .
. 50 (1 .
. 5 0 ( 0 .
.25(1 .
. 2 5 ( 0 .
. 5 0 ( 0 .
.75 (1 .
. 5 0 ( 0 .
00)
79)
50)
22)
50)
50 ^
30)
43)
50)
09)
50)
4.
3.
2.
9
2.'.
4.
2.
4 .
3.
4 .
4.
86(0
00(1
71(1
57(1
00(1
86(0
43(1
2 9 ( 0
71(1
14(0
0 0 ( 0
. 3 5 )
.31)
. 4 8 )
.18)
.31)
.35}
.50)
.70 )
- 1 6 )
. 6 4 )
. 7 6 )
4
3
9
2
O
/!
L<r
O
4
3
3
3
.71
. 14
. 42
.66
.36
.32
.09
.28
.72
.45
.98
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The results of this study indicate that through the use of
basic group communication coding techniques modified for the
cockpit setting, cockpit communication can be assessed in a
reliable, useful,, and consistant way. However, our method is
extremely tedious. We used independent study students as coders
which meant that training for standardisation was an important
task. The coders not only put all communication into the
designated categories, but they also transcribed the phrases that
they coded so they could be easily checked. Thus, it was possible
to code only about 20 minutes of each flight. A real-time coding
technique, such as KLM uses in their training course, may be of
value.
The PAQ yields, at best, mixed results in terms of its
prediction of overall communication rate. However, it does
predict certain types of communication such as disagreement,
commanding, and initiate-terminate. Other instruments are need to
predict communication behavior.
The crews with the highest levels of communication were those
with a mix of high and low expressivity in the crew. However, we
had only two crews in each of these conditions so the conclusion
is tentative, at best. The crews with the lowest levsl of
communication rate were the low, low crews.
All pilots performed the task well. However, the crews
headed by high expressivity captains maintained altitude much
better than those with low expressivity captains. Perhaps the PAQ
measures confidence in skill level more than expressivity.
Control levels of communication (Command, Request,
Suggestion, Observation) result in a strong interaction between
captains and first officex-s both before and after the engine
failure. Low E captains and first officers tend to give more
requests than suggestions. High E captains and first officers
behave in the opposite way. Perhaps the request is a lower level
of command to low E pilots but a higher level of command to high E
pilots.
First officers exhibit a higher level of communication
overall than do captains, not entirely explained by the almost
exclusive conversation with ATC. This was not the case in the KLM
flight shown in Appendix F.
Almost all pilots are high on instrumentality or goal
orientation. In our study, we found more pilots who were low than
high on expressivity. Because we used volunteers, perhaps, we had
a greater number of pilots who were willing to participate, in
part, because, as people low in expressivity, they were less
willing to say no than the high expressivity pilots. Another
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factor that may have influenced the results was the fact that a
number of our pilot-subject were either unemployed or changed
employment between the familiarisation and experimental flight.
In the debriefing attitude survey, our pilot subjects
generally agreed with the results of the Helmreich Attitude survey
of airline pilots. They believe that captains have the
responsibility to provide verbal communication concerning all of
their intentions as far1 as the aircraft is concerned. They also
believe that there are circumstances other than total captain
incapacitation which require first officer take over of command of
the aircraft.
More research is needed to establish the validity of
expressivity measurement techniques and cockpit communication
analysis techniques. We believe that other generalized instruments
as well as cockpit specific instruments should be used in the
assessment of cockpit expressivity. The KLM technique may hold
some promise along these lines.
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APPENDIX A: Cockpit Familiarisation Script
Updated March 7, 1984
R. Jensen
J. Eggspuehler
T-40 COCKPIT FAMILIARIZATION
This tape is designed to acquaint you with the T-40 flight simulator.
If you wish to stop the tape for any reason like locating a knob or
switch, simply depress the pause button on the recorder. You may want to
locate this button now for reference.
You should have the T-40 checklist available for reference as you
listen to this tape. Also, as the tape takes you through the cockpit,
feel free to flip switches, turn knobs, or move controls to check their
responses. This will help you remember the idiosyncracies of our cockpit.
You should be seated in the cockpit. If you need to adjust your seat,
the knobs are located on the wall side. The front knob moves the seat
horizontally and the back knot, vertically. You should have the T-40
checklists handy for reference as you listen to this tape.
The T-40 is a simulator for the Air Force T-39 and the Sabreliner
aircraft. This simulator came from the Air Force and it has several
military items; the most noticeable of which are a TACAN Radio and an
"identify friend or foe" transponder; however, you will not need any
military training for our simulation.
Let us go through the cockpit step by step. This briefing will divide
the front panel into three segments (left side, center, and then right
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side). Last, we will cover the center console and control yoke. For each
section, the briefing will start at the top of the panel and work down.
Again, stop this recording if you would like to examine something or if
you have questions.
Starting our orientation on the pilot's side, at the top you will see
the marker beacon lights, as well as a hi-lo switch and volume control for
the ILS marker beacon. To the right is the clock with working stop watch.
The second hand and additional minute hand are for the stop watch. Try
this now by depressing the button on the upper right to be sure you know
how it works. Press the button two more times to reset the stopwatch.
Beneath that are the basic flight instruments. There is also a Mach Meter
which will be used as a performance instrument. Notice the accelerometer
dial and gyro compass slaving switch; both of these are non-functional in
this simulator.
Look at the Course Select and HSI bearing toggle switches. The Course
Select switch allows you to select either TACAN or VOR/ILS for course
deviation indications on the HSI. The Course Select switch does not
affect the command bars on the attitude indicator. Either ADF or TACAN
information is presented on the small pointer located on the outside of
the HSI compass rose. When the switch is placed in NORMAL position, this
pointer will give you bearing information .to the TACAN. In the ADF
position the needle acts as an ADF giving you bearing information to the
ADF station selected. Because these important switches have somewhat
unusual functions, be sure that you understand their proper function.
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The Flight Director is controlled by two switches (the flight director
mode switch and the heading mode switch). When you put the heading mode
in "manual", the command bar will steer you to the heading that you have
selected on your HSI heading bug. In the "Normal" position the command
bar will be deactivated unless the Flight Director Mode is in the ILS or
ILS Approach position. Notice that the heading set knob is at the bottom
left of the HSI. The Heading Mode toggle switch should be in "Normal" to
receive signals for the approach.
The three positions on the flight director mode switch are NAV, ILS,
and ILS Approach. The NAV position should be used for enroute TACAN
navigation. In this position left-right course deviation will be
presented on the HSI needle. The ILS mode of the flight director will give
you the VOR/ILS receiver and steer you on the localizer course (presented
on the HSI needle) using the command bar on the Attitude Indicator. The
ILS "Approach Mode" will steer you both to the localizer and to
glide-slope using the command bars on the attitude indicator. The
glideslope indicator is on the left side of the attitude indicator.
The command bars are conventional for most military flight directors.
Their function is to provide commanded pitch (for glideslope) and bank
(for localizer) to make course corrections on the ILS more precise. To
use them you should steer, using pitch and bank, toward the needle and try
to keep the two needles centered. They are very sensitive. Do not
attempt to use them until you are well established on the localizer and
glideslope. Otherwise, they could lead you astray.
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Needle and ball information is presented at the bottom of the attitude
indicator.
The last items on the bottom of the left side, are 2 toggle switches -
for pttot heat and surface deice. This completes our tour of the left
side.
Next look at the center panel. At the very top are two nose-wheel-
steering-connect annunciator lights and two non-functional fire pull
handles. Beneath these on the left side, is a set of three position
toggle switches for audio control. Up is for speaker, center for off and
down for headset. All useable nav aids have aural identifiers.
Looking at your engine instruments next, you will see that there are
two sets, one for each engine. From top to bottom, these are; first -
exhaust-total-pressure (Pt5); second - percent-rpm; third - exhaust
temperature; fourth - fuel flow; fifth - oil pressure and, at the bottom,
fuel quantity. Percent RPM will be your primary instrument for power
information.
Start back up at the top for the radio package. For all the radios,
please note the on and off switches because they will not work unless
turned on. The TACAN, at the very top is needed for enroute navigation
where will you want DME information. Beneath the TACAN is a conventional
VHP Com Radio. Beneath the VHF Com radio is a standard VHF Nav radio. To
the right of the Nav radio is the ADF receiver. As the ADF is the older
"coffee-grinder" type tuner, take a moment to refresh yourself on how to
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tune it.
The aircraft checklist has been expanded somewhat to help that you
tune your navaids properly for enroute and ILS navigation. Take a look at
the BEFORE TAKEOFF and DESCENT checklists now to see how these are set.
Three important items in this regard are:
1. Use the TACAN for enroute navigation. Follow the checklist to set
it up.
2. For ILS approaches be sure that the COURSE SELECT switch is in the
VOR/ILS position. ''
3. Be sure to use the ADF tuned to the outer compass locator NDB as a
backup for the Marker Beacon.
Beneath the radio package are your primary and auxiliary hydraulic
pump toggle-switches and gauges. Beneath the engine instruments is the
gear handle. Notice that the three-in-the-green lights are underneath the
hydraulic gauges. Farther to the right you will see the flap indicator
and numerous toggle switches for electrical master, radio instrument
master, inverter, left and right DC generator and battery. The last items
on the center panel are located back up at the top. These are the three
trim gauges and outside air temperature gauge. Beneath them is a
press-to-test button for the annunciator panel.
The instruments on the right side are standard. The DME readout is
located on the top left. DME is available only from TACAN and both left
and right side will read distance from the same TACAN station. There is
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also a stop watch on this side and basic flight instruments. There is not
a Mach indicator on the right side. The two-needle RMI is clearly marked
to indicate that the number 1 needle can be ADF or TACAN as set by the
toggle switch on the right side. The Number 2 RMI needle is always set to
present information from the VHF Nav radio. The VOR head is selected with
the course-select toggle switch. If both pilot and copilot have their
course select switch in the same position, the copilot will have a course
select inop light on which means that the VOR head is slaved to the
pilot's selector. In other words, whatever the Captain dials in for
course will be indicated on the Co-pilot's VOR head.
The throttle quadrant is the last area to cover. Starting at the top,
you will see two ENGINE MASTER switches as well as a PUSH-TO-START switch.
The throttles should be locked in cut-off. To raise the throttles out of
this position, press the throttle lock button at the side of the lever
while raising the lever. Try this now for each throttle, one at a time.
Engine start is accomplished by depressing the start button and using
one hand to hold down the throttle lock button and the other to raise the
throttle after the RPM has reached 8%. You may try this now, but be sure
to use the checklist.
An important item which is easy to miss is the throttle friction lock
located on the left side of the quadrant. Adjust this now to your liking.
Last, return the throttles to the their locked cut-off position to shut
down the engines.
\
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The speed brake is located on the side of the left throttle lever. It
has three positions. The forward is the OFF position. Be sure it is in
this position for takeoff. The center or neutral position will keep the
speed brakes in whatever position you have selected. It will not bring
them in. The back position, which is spring loaded, will deploy the speed
brakes. You must hold it back for several seconds against the spring
pressure to deploy speed brakes. A word of caution: the only indications
of the position of the speed brakes are the position of the switch, a
sound of rushing air when they are fully deployed, and the changes to
aircraft performance. Each of these indications is quite subtle. The
most reliable information is in the position of the speed brake switch.
Back on top of the center pedastel on the right side is the fuel
selector switch. In the normal position the left wing tank feeds the left
engine, the right wing tank - the right engine and a center fuselage tank
feeds both wing tanks. Each fuel quantity guage indicates the quantity of
fuel in the respective tank plus half of the quantity from the center
fuselage tank.
On the left side of the center pedastel is the engine AIR START
switch. It is spring loaded and used to air-start both engines.
Beneath the throttles, to the left is a toggle switch for rudder trim
and to the right, a flap switch. Below these are toggle switches for
interior and exterior lighting. Of interest to you will be the panel
light switch which is a rheostat type and two toggle switches for Nav and
anti-collision.
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The next line of items has a toggle switch for parking brakes which
should be in the "on" position and an ID 351 switch. The function of the
ID 351 switch is to give the Co-pilot course selection control over the
Pilot's course selector. The bottom of the center console contains a
military type transponder. Simply dial in the transponder code, using the
right most four digits of the thumb wheel.
Next to the floor there is a plexiglass covered set of buttons that
you will not use. These switches are used to shut off the simulator in
the event of a malfunction or power shortage. We have similar switches
outside at the instructor panel which would be used if necessary.
The control yoke has three items of importance. First, a beehive
shaped knob controls both elevator and aileron trim. The rudder trim
control is located on the center console. All three trim guages are on
the top front panel to the right of radios. There is a red emergency
disconnect button on the control yoke for runaway trim which is
non-functional. Both control yokes also have a nose wheel connect/
disconnect button. As you will see in the checklist, you will disconnect
nose wheel steering during the take off roll at 60 knots. Press this
button now to disconnect and notice that the disconnect lights are the
green lights on the top center panel. As would be expected, depressing
this button in flight will not work as the relay is triggered by a squat
switch on the main gear.
The last button on the control yoke is simply a push-to-talk button.
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It is a two-position switch for intercom and ATC. We have wired it so
that the intercom is always hot. You do need to depress the button for
ATC.
This completes your cockpit orientation. If you have no further
questions, you are ready to fly.
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APPENDIX B: ATC Script
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APPENDIX C: Personal Attributes Questionnaire
AL PA@T'1§
POOR QUALITY
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS INVENTORY
NAME SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
These items below inquire about what kind of a person you think you
are. Each item consists of a pair of characteristics, with the letters
A-E in between. For example:
Not at all
Artistic A • • • • * i5 • • • * • v> • •*• • D • • *»»£* Very Artistic
Each pair describes contradictory characteristics — that is, you
cannot be both at the same time, such as very artistic and not at all
artistic.
The letters form a scale between the two extremes. You are to choose
a letter which describes where you fall on the scale. For example, if
you think you have no artistic ability, you would choose A. If you think
you are pretty good, you might choose D. If you are only medium, you
might choose C, and so forth. Circle the letter that best describes you.
Be sure to answer every question.
1. Not at all
aggressive
2. Very whiny
3. Not at all
independent
A* ••••.!$• • • • • v s * * * « * U * « « * «
A« •• • • IS • • •• •!>••• • • ! / • * • • •
A** • • • 0 • • • • • L* • • • • • JJ • * •• • £i
4. Not at all arrogant A.....B.....C D.....E
5. Not at all emotional A B C D E
6. Very submissive A B C D E
7. Very boastful A B C D E
8. Not at all excitable
in a major crisis
9. Very passive
10. Not at all
egotistical
11. Not at all able to
devote self com-
pletely to others
Am • • • • 15 • • • • Vs • •• • * U • •• • • •
A* •• • • D • • • • v> • * •• * U • • • • • •
A* •• • • D • •• • •
Very aggressive
Not at all whiny
Very independent
Very arrogant
Very emotional
Very dominant
Not at all boastful
Very excitable
in a major crisis
Very active
Very
egotistical
Able to devote self
completely
to others
GO TO NEXT PAGE
C-l
12. Not at all spineless A B C D E
13. Very rough A B C D E
14. Not at all com-
plaining A B C D E
15. Not at all helpful
to others A B C D E
16. Not at all competi-
t1 vS A«***«.D* ••*•(-*•• ••*!/••• • • Ci
17. Subordinates oneself
to others A B C D E
18. Very home oriented A B C D E
19. Very greedy A B.....C D E
20. Not at all kind A B C D E
21. Indifferent to
other's approval A B.....C D E
22. Very dictatorial A B C D E
23. Feelings not easily
hurt A B C D E
24. Doesn't nag A B C D E
25. Not at all aware of
feelings of others A B C D.....E
26. Can make decisions
easily A B C D E
27. Very fussy A B C D E
28. Gives up very
easily A B C D E
29. Very cynical A...
30. Never cries A...
31. Not at all self-
confident A« • •••!)•••• • U • • • • • L) • •
GO TO NEXT PAGE
Page 2
Very spineless
Very gentle
Very
complaining
Very helpful
to others
Very
competitive
Never subordinates
oneself to others
Very worldly
Not at all greedy
Very kind
Highly needful of
other's approval
Not at all
dictatorial
Feelings easily
hurt
Nags a lot
Very aware of feel-
ings of others
Has difficulty
making decisions
Not at all fussy
Never gives up
easily
Not at all cynical
Cries very easily
Very self-
confident
C-2
32. Does not look out
for self, principled A..
33. Feels very inferior A..
34. Not at all hostile A..
35. Not at all under-
standing of others A..
o
36. Very cold in rela-
tions with others
37. Very servile
38. Very little need
for security
39. Not at all gullible A..
40. Goes to pieces under
pressure
» D • • • • • L* • • • • • U • •• • • ij
» . D « « * * * L « « « * « * U * * * * » E j
» D * a * « « L # « * « * * U « • •••£*
i ••vs»*« ••!)•< .E
A
A
A
A
B f* T\• •• • • ^ • • • • • L / «
B r T\• • • • • v « « * * » * U «
B f* T\• • • • *o* * * • • u«
B r T\• • • • • o * • • • • u •
D • • • • • C • • • • • D *
• • * • E
• • • • E
• • • • E
....E
• • • • E
Page 3
Look out only for
self, unprincipled
Feels very superior
Very hostile
Very understanding
of others
Very warm in rela-
tions with others
Not at all servile
Very strong need
for security
Very gullible
Stands up well
under pressure
GO TO NEXT PAGE
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PART II
The following statements describe reactions to conditions of work and
challenging situations. For each item, indicate how much you agree or
disagree with the statement, as it refers to your self, by choosing the
appropriate letter on the scale, A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on
your answer, circle the letter that best describes your attitude. There are
no right or wrong answers.
41. I would rather do something at which I feel confident and relaxed than
something which is challenging and difficult.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree
42. It is important for me to do my work as well as I can even if it isnt't
popular with my co-workers.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree
43. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree
44. When a group I belong to plans an activity, I would rather direct it
myself than just help out and have someone else organize it.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree
45. I would rather learn easy fun games than difficult thought games.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly Strongly
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree
GO TO NEXT PAGE
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46. It is important to me to perform better than others on a task.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
I find satisfaction in working as well as I
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
can.
D
Slightly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
If I am not good at something I would rather keep struggling to master
it than move on to something I may be good at.
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
Once I undertake a task, I persist.
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
I prefer to work in situations that require
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
There is a satisfaction in a job well done.
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
a high level
D
Slightly
disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
of skill.
E
Strongly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
I feel that winning is important in both work and games.
A B C
Strongly Slightly Neither agree
agree agree nor disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
GO TO NEXT PAGE
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53. I more often attempt tasks that I am not sure I can do than tasks that I
believe I can do.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly
agree agree nor disagree disagree
Strongly
disagree
54. I find satisfaction in exceeding my previous performance even if I don't
outperform others.
A B C D E
Strongly
agree
Slightly
agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Slightly
disagree
Strongly
disagree
55. I like to work hard.
A B
Strongly
agree
Slightly
agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Slightly
disagree
Strongly
disagree
56. Part of my enjoyment in doing things is improving my past performance.
A B C D E
Strongly Slightly Neither agree Slightly
agree agree nor disagree disagree
Strongly
disagree
57. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
A B C D
Strongly
agree
Slightly
agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Slightly
disagree
Strongly
disagree
58. I like to be busy all the time.
A B C
Strongly
agree
Slightly
agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Slightly
disagree
- Strongly
disagree
59. I try harder when I'm in competition with other people.
A B C D
Strongly
agree
Slightly
agree
Neither agree
nor disagree
GO TO NEXT PAGE
Slightly
disagree
Strongly
disagree
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Page 7
60. It is important for me to get a job in which there is opportunity for
promotion and advancement.
61.
62.
A
Strongly
agree
B
Slightly
agree
C
Neither agree
nor disagree
It is important to my future satisfaction
career that pays well.
A
Strongly
agree
B
Slightly
agree
It is important to me to
prestige and recognition
A
Strongly
agree
B
Slightly
agree
C
Neither agree
nor disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
in life to have a job or
D
Slightly
disagree
have a job or career that will
from others.
C
Neither agree
nor disagree
D
Slightly
disagree
E
Strongly
disagree
bring me
E
Strongly
disagree
Please check to see that you have answered all questions. Place the
test in the envelope and return it to the secretary.
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APPENDIX D: Debriefing Questionnaire
ORIGINAL
OF POOR
Pilot Number
Date
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE
1. How do you think the simulator operated?
2. What options did you consider upon engine failure and GS inop?
3. What factors caused you to make your decision as you did?
4. How do you think you and the Captain/Copilot worked together?
5. How much sleep have you had in the last 24 hours?
6. What kind of a schedule have you maintained the last 24/36 hours?
7. How frequently do you make night trips with takeoff times after
11:00 PM?
8. Do you think that you are a "night person" - perform as well or
better at night as you do in the day time?
9. Have you been under any kind of stress - physical or mental, feeling
ill, taking any medication?
10. When was your last day off? How did you spend it?
11. How much have you flown with today's other cockpit crew member?
D-l
12. How well do you know the person you flew with today?
13. Are there any factors that you can think of that might have affected
the way you worked with the other crew member?
14. The pilot flying the aircraft should verbalize his plans for
maneuvers and should be sure that the information is understood and
acknowledged by the other pilot.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
15. It is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and
techniques of other crewmembers.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
16. Overall, successful flightdeck management is primarily a function of
the flying proficiency of the Captain.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
17. The Captain should take control and fly the aircraft in emergency
and nonstandard situations.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
18. First Officers should not question the decisions or actions of the
Captain except when they threaten the safety of the flight.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
19. Captains should encourage their First Officers to question
procedures during normal flight operations and in emergencies.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
D-2
20. There are no circumstances (except total incapacitation) where the
First Officer should assume command of the aircraft.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
21. Casual conversation in the cockpit during periods of low workload
can improve crew performance.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
22. My decision making ahility is as good in emergencies as in routine
flying situations.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly -
23. An effective pilot can leave behind personal problems when flying.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
24. Pilots should feel obligated to mention their own psychological
stress or physical problems to other flightcrew personnel before or
during a flight.
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Strongly - Slightly Neutral Slightly Strongly
D-3
THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE ON COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Debriefing Responses
QUESTION 1
Subj # Response
013 Okay
025 Fair to well
026 Ok
029 Very sensitive
032 Simulator operation seems higher than <sic> normal work load
033 Fair
038 It was a good simulation but naturally no realisstic feel.
039 Good simulator but very touchy. Overcontrol very easy.
041 Good
044 Good
045 Good
046 Pretty good except there isn't an NDE signal and the heading for
takeoff and landing (when on the runway is hard to keep straight
<sic>
047 No answer
048 OK as far as I can tell
049 Good
050 There didn't seem to be any problems at all.
051 Not too bad of in pitch (roll).
054 I never flew a jet before, but it seemed sensitive to me.
056 Reasonably well once the required control pressures were determined.
057 Good as what to be expected once you had time in it. (HDI sticks)
QUESTION 2
013 Restart engine (several times): (descent and attempt to restart)
shutdown, raise min on approach
025 Engine failure (1) flap setting on App GG MDA change possible 1
engine go around
026 speed Alt & MDA
029 OK weather at destination to maintain airspeed.
032 engine restart (1 time) GS inop use col only
033 engine failure was good. There was a little confusion on the
glideslope failure because of not being familiar with the equipment.
039 restart, localizer or beacom approach.
039 LDC approach NDB approach with GS inop continue flight try relight
with engine failure.
041 Eng. failure - what airport can we land it? wx considerations, etc.
GS ino - Loc only appr.
045 Another airport relight / GS LOC approach, GS monitor on?
044 Another airport. Eng. relight GS Monitor
046 Refer to engine failure checklist and continue to MSP GS inop:
localizer approach.
047 Weather (landing minimums) Hydraulic system operation, alternate
destination, equipment opeeration with reduced electrical load.
D-4
048 Restarting alternate destinations, goo around to previously agreed
alternate.
049 LND wt weather another approach not available if we missed.
050 Missed approach with ILS to runway 29L
051 Location of VFP wx at destination and departure points. LOC app
minimums
056 Checking wx at destination or most suitable airport in point of time,
we had GS inop LOC only minimums.
057 1 as co-pilot followed capt. orders and offered advice after (crisis
situation over with)
OUESTION 3
013 aircraft flies better on two. After descent and start of approach,
we just flew the A/C regulations require min. increase
025 Lose of Eng. & GS
026 App plates
029 Nearly time for normal descent to airport weather ok
032 engine restart to confirm engine failure we were on and established
for rny 4 KS only logical to continue using LOC min.
033 engine restart was a good possibility totry since there was no fire
or apparent reason for failure.
035 It is what I would have done had it been an actual appr.
039 fuel load approaches available flight conditions
041 MSP was closest suitable airport
045 Weather at other airports and into ILS on rwy 4.
044 No other apparent choices.
046 Atis weather was above MDA for LOC approach.
047 Area weather all IFR destination wx above landing minimums. Good
engine out performance.
048 Various flight conditions.
049 Weather was not bad and aircraft was operating well on one engine.
Lots of power and fuel left if we missed annd could go try the ILS
29L.
050 Weather was 60 Z with non-precision that seemed ok.
056 Wx and distance to destination.
057 Following check list and command of PIC then I put my 2 cents in.
OUESTION 4
013 not at all
025 very well
026 . very well
029 OK
032 well
033 very well
038 very well
038 very well
041 good
045 good
044 good
046 good for not knowing aircraft systems.
047 very well for not knowing simulator procedures very well.
048 very well
D-5
049 very good
050 just fine; co-pilot was helpful.
051 well
056 I was pleased with the overall crew crew coordination since we had
not flown together in a jet.
057 very well
QUESTION 5
013
025
025
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
61/2 hrs
10 hrs
6 hrs
5
7 hrs
7 hrs
5 hrs
6 hrs
7 hrs
6 hrs
5 hrs
7 1/2 hrs
61/2 hrs
6.5
8 hrs
8 hrs
6 hours
6 1 / 2 - 7 hrs
8 hrs
QUESTION 6
013 easy not working now
025 heavy
026 8 hrs rest 16 hrs duty/20 hrs duty 16 hrs rest
029 office work - planning recurrent training
032 total 18 hrs work 7 hrs sleep 5 leisure
033 op at 6:00 a.m. work & school to 9:30 p.m. long days the school is a
temporary item (cram courses)
038 off
039 rest
041 Dec. 12, 13 off Dec 14 (flew A-7 in A.M.)
045 13 hr day on 1/31/85 6 hrs sleep last night
044 early takeoff yesterday
046 have been on vacation. Taking it easy, no flying
047 worked 12 p.m.-8 p.m. sleep 12 a.m.-6:30 a.m. reading 8 p.m. - 12
a .m.
048 normal
049 a little less sleep than normal helped a friend move to ATL and drove
22 hrs without rest.
050 off Sunday 24 hrs. 12:00 - 0800 sleep drove 2 1/2 hrs prior to
flight
051 heavy
056 Hectic to say the least. Many time demand functions
057 rest period
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QUESTION 7
029 1-2 times per month
041 7 times a month
045 very few
044 very seldom
046 very rarely
047 5-6 times a month
048 never
050 not frequently at all
051 15%
057 about 1/4 of the time
QUESTION 8
029 No - a day person
041 if you're absolutely rested
045 no
044 not necessarily
046 no
047 yes
048 no
049 about the same
050 don't perform as well after 0100. Up to that seems to he fine
051 yes yes
056 no
057 yes
QUESTION 9
013 no
025 no physical stress above average to average mental stress no
medication
026 A bit of mentala stress
029 slightly tired - lack of sleep
033 No
038 looking for a full time job
039 no
041 none
045 no
044 no
046 no
047 mental stress wife with illness
048 no
050 taking courses. 12 hrs graduate study - final exams last week.
Hernia operation 6 weeks ago. Just returned to flight status.
051 No
056 mental stress
057 no
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QUESTION 10
013 yesterday (unemployed) reading, working with home computer,
exercise.
025 over 15 days ago working at home
026 4 May 84 mowing grass
029 Sunday 12-9-84
032 Sunday 5-6-84 Yard work
033 Sunday a week ago, 9 days ago I spent it with my family
038 yesterday - working around the house
039 yesterday watching TV
041 yesterday
045 1/29/84 went ice fishing, did very well, too
044 2 days ago I did freelance Ak maintenance
046 9/22/84 changed the oil in my truck and washed it and did 3 sets of
Jeppsens
047 5 days ago spent working at home
048 yesterday litigation (won!!!)
049 Sunday 11/24/84 sitting at ATL airport trying to get home
050 11/25 Sunday - Church/relaxing TV/Church in evening
051 4 days ago at home sick
056 yesterday - between 7:30 a.m. and 9:30 p.m. I made stops at 16 points
within the city
057 yesterday Wednesday
QUESTION 11
013 0 (zero)
025 300 hrs +
026 300 hrs +
029 None
032 600 hrs +
033 2 years
038 very little
039 zero (0)
041 None
045 100 hrs
044 150 hrs
046 100 hrs
047 100 hrs
048 never
049 500 hrs
050 500 hrs in Merlin III
051 never
056 45 minutes
057 only once in turbo arrow about 45 minutes
QUESTION 12
013 Fine
025 Fair to well
026 Good
029 Never met before
032 we work well together
D-8
033 good
038 very good
039 excellent
041 Met on day of flight
045 pretty well
044 well
046 good We fly together as much as any crew at our company.
047 Worked at same establishment for 4 yrs.
048 Fairly. He is my instructor. 15 hrs total conversation
049 good friends
050 very well about 7 years
051 as a simulator student - not very
056 Fairly well - good communication report 4 yrs
057 Only flew with him once but have good discussions with him on several
occasions.
QUESTION 13
013 Neither one of us knew enough about the A/C to fly without using the
checklist
025 Disagreement with Co-pilot within the last 3 days
026 No
029 question left blank
032 No
033 Lack of familiarity with the equipment
038 No
039 The knowledge a friendship made working easier. The past experience
of both makes thinking similar in similar circumstances.
041 not working together before
045 no except positive
044 no
046 I wasn't as sharp as I should have beenn because of being on
vacation, I haven't flown in 7 days.
047 not very familar with this aircraft and cockpit procedures
048 not answered
049 no
050 If other crewmember is making mistakes or I don't trust him. Not the
case here.
051 no
056 additional crew coordination briefing
054 If (unreadable) it might make me feel uneasy and therefore have a Tot
more fatigue.
QUESTION 14
013
025 Ag Str
026 Ag Str
029 A Sli
032 Ag Str
033 A Str
038 A Str
039 A Sli
D-Q
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
OUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
A Sli
A Str
A str
A str
A Str
D Str
A Str
A Str
A Str
A Str
A Str
15
Di Str
Di Sli
New
Di Str
Neu
A Sli
A Str
D Sli
A Sli
A Sli
A Sli
A Sli
answered verbally
A Str
D Sli
A Str
A Str
D Str
16
Neu
Ag Sli
A Sli
Di Str
A Sli
D Sli
D Sli
A Sli
D Str
D Str
Nev
D Sli
D Str
D Str
D Sli
D Sli
D Sli
D Sli
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QUESTION 17
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
Ag Str
Ag Sli
A Sli
Di Str
A Str
A Sli
Neu
D Sli
Nev
Nev
A Sli
A Sli
D Str
D Str
Nev
Nev
D Sli
D Sli
18
Ag Sli
Ag Sli
D Sli
Di Str
A Sli
A Str
D Str
D Str
A Sli
A Sli
Nev
A Sli
A Sli
D Sli
D Str
D Sli
D Str
D Sli
19
Ag Str
Ag Str
A Sli
Ag Str
Nev
A Str
D Sli
A Str
A Sli
A Sli
D-ll
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
A Str
A Str
A Str
A Sli
A Str
A Str
A Str
A Sli
20
Di Str
Nev
A Sli
Di Str
Nev
D Str
D Str
D Str
D Sli
D Str
D Str
A Sli
D Str
A Sli
D Str
A Sli
D Sli
Nev
21
Nev
Ag Str
A Sli
Ag Sli
A Str
A Sli
A Str
A Sli
A Sli
A Sli
Nev
Nev
A Sli
A Str
A Str
A Str
A Sli
A Sli
D-12
QUESTION 22
025
026
029
032
033
038
X039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057 .
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
046
047
048
049
050
051
056
057
QUESTION
025
026
029
032
033
038
039
041
045
044
Nev
Ag Sli
A Sli
Ag Sli
Nev
A Str
D Sli
A Str
D Sli
A Sli
A Sli
A Sli
D Str
A Str
A Str
A Sli
A Sli
A Sli
23
Dis Str
Ag Str
A Sli
Dis Sli
A Sli
A Sli
D Sli
A Sli
A Sli
A Sli
A Str
A Sli
A D Str
A Sli
D Sli
Nev
A Sli
A Str
24
Ag Str
Ag Str
Nev
Ag Sli
Nev
A Sli
A Sli
Nev
D Str
A Sli
D-13
Stt
050
051
057
Stt
Stt
D-l*
OF POOR
, n,,-h !<=<-•+ Questionnaires
APPENDIX E: Various other oubaec.
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY Protocol No. 79B0069
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
I consent to participating as a pilot in NASA/OSU research to
investigate cockpit workload and resource management in a T-40 flight
simulator. I understand that the simulator cockpit environment will be
video taped for use by-the researchers to document ATC procedures, cockpit
workload and instrument readings. Upon completion of this research
project, by mutual agreement with NASA and OSU, the video tape will be
erased.
Dr. Jensen, the Principal Investigator, or his authorized
representative has explained to me the purpose of the study, the
procedures to be followed, and the expected duration of my participation.
Possible benefits of the study have been described as have alternative
procedures, if such procedures are applicable and available.
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional
information regarding the study and that any questions I have raised have
been answered to my full satisfaction. Further, I understand that I am
free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue participation in
the study without prejudice to me. The information obtained from me will
remain confidential unless I specifically agree otherwise by placing my
initials here .
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the
consent form. I sign it freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given to
me.
Date: Signed:
Participant
Signed: fc^ C^f^ / ~^
(Principal investigator orXfiis/her
Authorized Representative^
Witness:
E-l
T-40 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
ASSUMPTIONS:
Takeoff Weight = 17,000
Landing Weight = 15,000
Runway Length = 9,000
Runway Condition - GOOD
TAKEOFF:
VI = 109kts
Vr = 119kts
V2 = 125kts
CLIMB:
240kts to 10,000 feet
270kts to Mach .64
Mach .64 to Cruise Altitude
Gear Speed: ISOkts
Flap Speed: ISOkts
Approach Flaps (66%) ok @ 225kts
Pitch Attitude: 12 degrees up
to 3,000 feet AGL
Then approx. 8 deg
NOTE: Pt5 indicates total pressure
at turbine blade #5.
Pt5/Stand Press = EPR
CRUISE:
Set Power for Mach .77 at FL280
APPROACH:
Initial Approach: 175kts (flaps extended and gear down prior to
intercepting final approach course)
Final Approach: 135kts (Set power at approx. 75% RPM)
LANDING:
115kts
POWER:
Takeoff and Climb = 100% RPM
Cruise = approx. 91% RPM (Set to Mach .77)
Descent = as required
TACAN Channels:
APE
TVT
ZZV
114
112
51
BAE
ODI
FGT
GEP
111
126
104
120
MCW
FOD
ONL
96
82
86
E-2
Pilot Number
Date
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
NAME
ADDRESS
PHONE
AGE SEX
CURRENT EMPLOYER AND POSITION
FLYING EXPERIENCE
Flight Certificates and Ratings
Total Flight Time
Total Flight Simulator Time
Flight time in last 6 months
Total Turbine Time (Pilot + Copilot)_
Turbo Prop Time (Pilot + Copilot)
Turbine Time as Captain
Cockpit Position Most Commonly
Held during the Past Year Pilot Copilot_
Type of Flying Done Currently
Airline Corporation
Charter Flight Instruction_
Personal Other
Military Flying Total Time
E-3
WEATHER SEQUENCE REPORTS
ORD SA 1456 HI X 3/4 BS 049/32/30/0110/963
MKE SA 1448 M2 X 1/4 BS 025/34/33/3405/987
llS>~s7r~145T M3~ OVC T/2^ BS: 085/32/31/3510/987
MSN SA 1446 El OVC 1/4 BS 038/30/28/0910/965
LSE SA 1455 M2 OVC 1/4 S 075/30/28/3510/975
~AUW~ ~SA~ ~1452 M3 OVC '2 R 08373673573605/978
CBG SA 1450 M4 OVC 3/4 RBS 091/34/33/3610/980
SUX SA 1450 M12 OVC 5R 115/35/29/3315/977
~EALI" SA~i449 "Ml OVC 1/4S 117/30/29/3410020/988
DLH SA 1450 MS OVC 6 120/22/15/3215/989
TERMINAL FORECASTS
_MJ5P_FT 101515 C3 OVC 1/2 3510. 18Z C50VC IBS 3315.
~
:
 21Z C8 OVC 2BS 33515 09Z IFR.
MKE FT 101515 C2X 1/4 BS 1810. 18Z CSX 1/2 BS 2415.
21Z C4 OVC 1/2 BS 2720. 09Z IFR.
SUX FT 101515 C7 OVC 5R 3315
21Z C12 OVC 3520. 09Z VFR.
ORD FT 101515 C 3X 3/4 0110. 18Z C80VC 1 1/2 R 3515.
21Z C8 OVC 2 R 3320. 09Z IFR.
WINDS ALOFT FORECASTS
3000 6000 9000 12000 18000 24000 30000 34000 39000
~DSM~". 2620 2230-12 2235-17 2033-23 1847-34 1763-43 153558 169471 740377
J3RB _1?20.__ 2125-122325-172035-222044-35 1660-45 147857 179372 741374
MSP 3315 2430-11 2230-18 2034-23 2039-37 1657-48 138058 129575 740977
ORD 0215 2625-13 2432-19 2237-24 2043-36 1660-43 123560 139373 741075
APPENDEX F: KLM Communication Coding Questionnaires and Dal
ORIP5NAL PA8E 5S
OE POOR QUALITY
ORIGINAL PAG'E'IS
OF POOR QUALITY
KLM Communication Coding Forms and Data
Tne tiLrt Crew Management Course administered by inlieract:.on Train
L±,::i. ox lingiand includes an impressive technique t:or co
communication data called "Behavioral Analysis." This techn
identifies 13 catagories of communication behavior as shown in
observer form called "Cockpit- Communication Workload" presented on
F-2. Definitions of these categories are shown on Page F-3. . Pag^s
and F-5 present -an interpretation of the ratios of each category
represent effective cockpit communication beha.vior. Tatlo F-1 pros
the results of a communication behavior coding effort from a sinr..:i
coding scheme for categorising cockpit communication da to in t..:r;.;s"
in Ln-j KLM course.
Table F - 1 . Communication Numbers for Each of the Behavioral
Categories Observed curing a LOFT scenario.
Flight Segmeni
Takeoff DC
Cpt F/0 Cpt F/0 Opt F/0
-. .-_
Preflt Startur> escent Lancing
Reacting
Disagreeing 1, 1, 3
Defend/Attack
Blocking
open
'i ot ai
Immediate
i o H- a i.
I nf or Prooes 5 ing
r;-, •-.--, :~.s F-,-r,i
-'-*••—*•&.• •-• A - iv ~
Giving Ops Info
Giving Info
Asides
Checking
ATC
Tl.. i. _, T
Questioning.
Seeking Info
Testing Una
Testing Und-Sim
Total
4,1 2 , 3
13, 3, .
1 5 0 8 0
•j , 2,
32,11 1,
11,7 21,5
6, 4
30.30 15,15
15 5,5
90,67 45,27
5, 2,1
O O 1
•-> , ^  ) -1-
P O v- O
7
21
O O
i^!
6
14
g
5
33
o
i^
c
4 J~J> , 0
,3 13,6
,3 15,6
•i •«
,4 16,16
,14 1,1
,14 ,15
,34 10, 12
,67 34,45
, 1 -1 ,
'•"•' 5 4
,3 ' 9,4
O , L
verall Total
Page Intentionally Left Blank
r^ TS
cXj
j
CATEGORIES
Supporting
Disagreeing
o
£ Defend/Attack
a
Blocking/Diff
Open
0
2 Immediate
Q
8 Deferred
Giving Expl
Giving Op Info
o
£ Giving Info
CO
§ Asides
a.
£ Checking
2 ATC
Broadcast
PA
o Seeking Info
z
2 Testing Und
H
§ Testing Und-Sim
or
z Physical Action
Ej
Totals
V
COCKPIT COMMUNICATION
WORKLOAD
TYPE - . . , CREW
ROUTE ^ • ' DATE
A/II
4*
£
<tt &
t U
• *
O. 01
** 3
*• O
I A
1 - 1 - 0
o a c
— u v —3 • a x
u a -J t-
a
•a
3
05
CAPTAIN
•
CO-PILOT FLIGHT ENG.
-
r
CABIN ATC
"
GRD. TOT.
J
Itrf.
F-2
BGL3VI
SPL/NT - flight crew training
CREW MANAGEMENT COURSE
PROPOSING
PR
BUILDING
BU
SUPPORTING
SP
DISAGREEING
DS
DEFENDING/
ATTACKING
DA
BLOCKING/
DIFFICULTY
STATING
8D
OPEN
OP
TESTING
UNDERSTANDING
TU
SUMMARIZING
SU
SEEKING
INFORMATION
SI
GIVING
INFORMATION
GI
SHUTTING OUT
SO
BRINGING IN
BI
VERBAL BEHAVIOUR CATEGORIES
Behaviour which puts forward a new concept, suggestion
or course of action (and is actionable).
Behaviour which extends or develops a proposal which
has been made bv another person (and is actionable).
Behaviour which ir. olves a conscious and direct declaration
of support or agreement with another person or his concepts.
direct and reasoned
or criticism of
Behaviour which involves a conscious.
declaration of difference of opinion.
another person's concepts.
Behaviour which attacks another person or defensively
strengthens an individual's own position. Defending/
attacking -behaviours usually involve explicit value
judgements and often contain emotional overtones.
Behaviour which places a difficulty or block in the path
of a proposal or concept without offering any alternative
proposal and without offering a reasoned statement of
disagreement. Blocking/difficulty stating behaviour therefore
tends to be rather bald; e.g. "It won't work", or
"We couldn't possibly accept that".
Behaviour which exposes the individual who makes it to
risk of ridicule or loss of status. This behaviour may
be considered as the opposite of defending/attacking,
including within this category admissions of mistakes
or inadequacies provided that these .are made in a non-
defensive manner.
Behaviour which seeks to
earlier contribution has
establish whether
been understood.
or not an
Behaviour which summarizes, or otherwise restates in a
compact form, the content of previous discussions or
considerations.
B?haviour which seeks facts, opinions or clarification
from another individual or individuals.
Behaviour which offers facts, opinions or clarification
to another individual.
Behaviour which excludes, or attempts to exclude, another
group-member (e.g. interrupting, talking over).
Behaviour which is a direct and positive attempt to
involve another group-member.
authority:
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effective:
June 1985
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SPL/NT - flight crew training CREW MANAGEMENT COURSE
SUMMARY OF INTERPRETIVE FACTORS
Behaviours
Proposing
Building
Supporting
Disagreeing
Defend/Attack
Blocking/Difficulty
Stating
Open
Testing
Understanding
Summarizing
Seeking
Information
Giving
Information
Shutting Out
Bringing In
1-18
Guideline
Ratios etc.
2/1
under 10%
-low reaction
over 20 % in-
creases -into
High Reaction
-5
10
45
These
usually .
occur with
behaviours
from the
above list
10%
1/2
Notes
These behaviours are about
'concern for action1 yours
and others. Building embodies
implicit support and explicit
proposal. To achieve 2/1 you
are showing considerable
interest in others' ideas.
Balance of supporting versus
disagreeing + Defend/Attack
will indicate additionally the
overall reactive picture
which is communicated.
Relate to TU and SI. Ability
to use open behaviour is
important but too much can be
as much of a problem as none
at all.
Clarity of discussion is
related directly to TU+SU.
In a group much of this
function is often delegated
to one member.
SI clarifies, GI can cause
listening and thinking pro-
blems. 30% GI is an
economical amount, the higher
levels of GI reach 65%.
Typical range 5 - 40%. Beware
of judgements based on
figures alone. Did the
circumstances demand it?
Typical range 0-3%. This
behaviour can be used in a -
wide variety of ways: to draw
reaction, to involve a quiet
person, to redirect the
discussion and to express
interest in others.
authority:
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SPL/NT - flight crew training CREW MANAGEMENT COURSE
LOOKING AT BEHAVIOUR DATA
CATEGORIES
PROPOSING
BUILDING
SUPPORTING
DISAGREEING
DEFENDING/
ATTACKING
BLOCKING
DIFFICULTY STATING
OPEN
TESTING
UNDERSTANDING
SUMMARIZING
SEEKING
INFORMATION
GIVING
INFORMATION
TOTALS
for A,B,C,D,E
respectively
SHUTTING OUT
BRINGING IN
A
14
1
11
10
2
5
3 .
1
-
11
62
120
18
1
A's valid thoughts on looking at his
own data.
I seem to have put forward much more of
•^^ v^ ^ own ideas without building on other
""^ 14 : 1 peoples suggestions.
^^ ""^  How well does the proposing work?
Would more building give any advantage?
______ 0=1 nv Rparfinn - ^ppm fn havp rpfirfprt n Inf
.X/7 mainly in disagreeing ways. How
' /H appropriate was that in discussion?
// Had I a clear enough idea of others'
/// views on which to react like this, or
' // was I simply pressing for my own
// wishes? Could some more building have
// been done to useful effect?
*^^ "^  much other people were doing worth
^ keeping an eye on.
/
3.6 : 1 If the discussion was messy periiapb
more SI would have been useful.
Certainly a lot of information was
given and maybe more questions (SI)
would reduce this level. Was the
information significant in the
discuss inn?
How much did I say compared with the
others? Too much? Too little? Would
158 83 61 166 I have preferred it to have been
different? If so, what would be the
shut out. How appropriate was it? What
behaviour most frequently came with the
shut out? What effect or consequence is
it likely to have? How closely does
that reflect everyday behaviour?
appropriate? What could have been
oained from havina more?
authority:
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TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS
Subject:..
Duration:.
Source:...
Reference:
X1
LIFE
POSITIONS
PARENT
CRIT
NUR
ADULT
CHILD
NAT
ADAP
LITTLE
PROF
TOTALS
A
OK-OK
OK-NOK
NOK-OK
NOK-NOK
TOTAL A BEHAV.
SHARE
OF
INTER.
B
OK-OK
OK-NOK
NOK-OK
NOK-NOK
TOTAL B BEHAV.
SHARE
OF
INTER
NOTES
TOTAL BEHAVIOURS
IN INTERACTION
1977 F-6
interaction Irainers ltd.
